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School Dist.

of Abington

Schempp, 31 U.S.L.

Township

WEEK 4683

v.

(U.S.

June 17, 1963).
While the issue of required Bible read
ing, as such, had never before been squarely

3

People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610

(1927); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171
Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927).
4

E.g., Spiller v. Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen)

127 (1866); Wall v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417
(Mass. 1859); compare Church v. Bullock, 104
Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
5

Hackett v. Brooksdale, 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W.

792 (1905); Lewis v. Board of Educ., 157 Misc.
520, 285 N.Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1935), modi
fied on other grounds, 247 App. Div. 106, 286

1

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,

31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4689 (U.S. June 17, 1963).

N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1936), appeal dis
missed, 276 N.Y. 490, 12 N.E.2d 172 (1937).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the Bible was non-sectarian on the ground
that our nation is founded on Christianity
and hence, the Bible was actually the
foundation of our laws, customs and institutions. 6 On the other hand, the Bible
reading requirements of certain school dis-

tricts have been declared unconstitutional
7
with far more consistency.
In Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors,s the reading of the New Testament
as the Word of God was declared to be
discriminatory against the Jewish people.

Despite a clause excusing religious dissenters, the law was declared unconstitutional because it tended either to force
the pupil to participate against the dictates
of his religion or to subject him to a
religious stigma in being placed in a class
by himself. Bible reading practices have
also been declared unconstitutional at the
instance of Catholics who have objected to
6Stevenson v. Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585, 590

(1898).
"[I]n our opinion the reading of the Bible and
repeating of the Lord's Prayer without comment
in opening exercises is necessarily devotional....
The cases sustaining Bible reading in school exercises consistently evade or ignore this fact and
thereby fall into error." State ex rel. Finger v.
Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 351, 226 N.W. 348, 352
(1929); "The only means of preventing sectarian
instruction in the school is to exclude altogether
religious instruction, by means of the reading of
the Bible or otherwise. The Bible is not read in the
public schools as mere literature or mere history.
It cannot be separated from its character as an inspired book of religion." People ex rel. Ring v.
Board of Educ., 245 II1. 334, 348, 92 N.E. 251,
255 (1910); "[Tlhe Bible contains numerous doctrinal passages upon some of which the peculiar
creed of almost every religious sect is based ... "
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist.
No. 8 of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 194, 44 N.W. 967,
973 (1890); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102
Wash. 369, 376, 173 Pac. 35, 37 (1918); cf. State
ex rel. Freeman v. Schive, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W.
846 (1902), modified, 65 Neb. 876, 93 N.W. 169
(1903); State ex rel. Clithers v. Showalter, 159
Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000 (1930).
7

the use of the King James version or have
objected to the reading of the Bible without, what they felt was, the proper interpretationY
The Supreme Court first exercised its
influence in this area in the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,'" holding that the liberties protected by the due process clause of

the fourteenth amendment include the freedoms and liberties of religion established
by the first amendment. Prior to that decision the states were generally free through
the regulation of public education to substantially influence religious matters. The
Court had interfered with the states only
when the states' infringement on religious
rights was coupled with an infringement
upon property without due process of law."
In the Cantwell case as well as in many

subsequent decisions the Court was concerned with either the states' prevention
of the free exercise of religion or with the
1
free exercise of speech in religious matters. "
In Cantwell the Court specifically declared

unconstitutional a law under which two
Jehovah Witnesses were convicted for
soliciting funds without a permit. The
Court found that although the states have
8 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915).
OPeople ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., supra

note 7; State v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8
of Edgerton, supra note 7. Contra, Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., supra note 3.
10 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
"1E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
"2E.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); see
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), where the Court, in striking down a statute requiring the expulsion of any student who
refused to recite the pledge of allegiance, stated
that the purpose of the first amendment is to
preserve religious rights from all official control.

9
a right to protect citizens by regulating
solicitations of money, Connecticut should
have chosen one of the available means
which did not tend to place a prior restraint
on free speech in religious matters. 3 The
Court recognized, however, an important
distinction between freedom to believe and
freedom to act, holding the former to be
absolute but the latter subject to regulation.' "
In Everson v. Board of Educ., 15 the
Court allowed state reimbursement of citizens who expended money for bus fares by
sending their students to private schools.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
stated that:
We must be careful in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not
inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to
all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief. 1b
He was, however, careful to distinguish
between the expenditures of tax money
for the purpose of supporting religious
activities (which he thought would be unconstitutional) and the expenditure of tax
money for the general welfare of all children of school age regardless of the school
they attended. He held the latter to be
constitutional notwithstanding the fact that
such expenditures might indirectly assist
some church by encouraging a parent to
send his child to a more distant religious
7
institution.'
13The Supreme Court in what amounted to a
corollary to the Cantwell decision held unconstitutional a law requiring a license to sell religious papers. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943).
14Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940).
1"330 U.S. 1 (1947).

16 Id. at 16.
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This principle of indirect aid was also
applied by the Supreme Court in affirming
the validity of Sunday Closing Laws. 18 The
Court was careful to point out that the
questioned laws were designed to accomplished a necessary secular purpose,
namely to provide a respite from work, and
that these laws were only incidentally beneficial or discriminatory toward certain religions. 19
In Engel v. Vitale,'0 the highly celebrated
School Prayer Case, the Court struck down
the non-sectarian Regents Prayer as being a
violation of the "establishment clause." The
Court stated that this religious exercise,
sponsored by a governmental body, tended
to coerce religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing religious beliefs. 21 Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated
that the Regents Prayer amounted to a use
of public facilities for a religious exercise.
He felt that any use of public facilities for
17 In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,

333 U.S. 203 (1948), the majority stated that
sending religious educators into public schools
was beyond doubt a utilization of the tax supported public school system as an aid to religious
groups in spreading their faiths and hence unconstitutional. However, in Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court held that released

time instructions did not violate the first amendment.
18 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
1'"[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting
a general law within its power, the purpose and

effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden." Braunfeld v. Brown,

supra note 18, at 607.
20 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
211d. at 430. "[F]reedom of worship

... may not
be submitted to a vote ... "West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, supra note 12, at 638.
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such a purpose would be unconstitutional.22
In retrospect, the entire line of Supreme
Court decisions prior to the newly decided
Bible case indicated that the Court would
be most unwilling to accept as constitutional
any use of public facilities, personnel, or
funds exclusively or primarily for the teaching of religion. Lower courts, for the most
part, have held prescribed Bible reading to
be violative of the first amendment. In the
light of such background, the Court's decision in the Bible case is neither surprising
nor unprecedented, but rather, the next step
in a logical progression of decision aimed
at religious neutrality.
In the principal case, the first fact situation concerned the Schempp children who
attended the local high school. They were
Unitarians and, therefore, not in accord
with the teachings of the Bible. Each morning in accordance with a Pennsylvania
statute,23 the school conducted a salute
to the flag followed by a reading of ten
verses from the Bible and concluded by
a recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Although
the school district had supplied copies of
only the King James version, other versions could be used. There were no prefatory statements and no comments on the
verses chosen. The children were informed
that they could absent themselves from the
service. Their father testified that although
he had considered having the children
excused from the service he declined to
do so, fearing that the "children's relationships with their teachers and classmates
could be adversely affected. ' '24 A religious
expert testified that if portions of the Bible
were read without explanations it could be
221d.
23

at 441.

PA. STAT. tit. 24, §15-1516 (Supp.

1960).
24 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4684 (U.S. June 17, 1963).

psychologically harmful to children of
various sects. The district court granted
the injunction sought by the Schempp
family and the Abington School District
25
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The second set of facts discussed by the
principal decision concerned a mother and
son, both professed atheists. In 1905 the
Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore adopted a rule providing for the reading of a chapter of the Bible without comment as an opening exercise in the
schools. 2 Although the son had been excused from the exercise, petitioners brought
a writ of mandamus claiming that the
practice discriminated against them by
placing a "premium on belief as against
nonbelief and subjects this freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority. ' ' 27 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland denied the
relief sought and an appeal was taken to
28
the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, concluded that the federal government
can neither favor a given religion nor "aid
those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs. '29 The Court
held that the government must remain
neutral not only to prevent a breach of the
"establishment clause" but also to avoid
violations of the "free exercise clause"
Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959), appeal vacated
and remanded, 364 U.S. 298 (1960), 201 F. Supp.
815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 371 U.S.
807 (1962); 30 FORD L. REV. 801 (1962); 28
GEO WASH. L. REV. 519 (1960).
26
MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §202 (1957).
27 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4685.
28 Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698,
cert. granted, 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
29 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4689.
25
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which guarantees the right of free choice
of worship without compulsion. The opinion, in establishing the test for determining
violations of the first amendment, found the
determinative factors to be the primary
purpose and the primary effect of the
legislation. To avoid the strictures of the
"establishment clause," the primary purpose of the legislation must be secular
while at the same time it may neither advance nor inhibit religion. To avoid the
restraints of the "free exercise clause" the
legislation must not act coercively to the
detriment of an individual in the practice
of his religion. The latter would require
definite proof of the harm to the complainant whereas the former would not.30
Having thus established the test, the
Court applied it to the statutes at issue and
found that such prescribed reading of the
Bible was unquestionably religious in
nature and that it tended to be coercive
since one must either participate or be
religiously stigmatized. Although the Court
never specified which clause (establishment
or free exercise) had been violated, it concluded that this use of public funds, facilities and faculty to teach religion was a
31
violation of governmental neutrality.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting
opinion, expressed the belief that neither
Supreme Court precedent nor the first
amendment required the complete secularization of the public school systems. 3 2 In
contradistinction to the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas, he claimed that
there was no constitutional prohibition on
30 Id. at 4688; Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1963).
31 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 24, at 4690.
32 Id. at 4715; see Costanzo, Prayer in Public
Schools, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 269, 278 (1962).

1963

the use of public facilities for religious
purposes. In fact, he argued that such
prohibition would place religion at "an
artificial and state created disadvantage." 33
It was Justice Stewart's contention that as
long as variations in the particular Bible to
be used existed, no particular religion is
favored; hence no religion is established.
He conceded, however, that absent such
tolerated variation the law in question might
well be unconstitutional. Justice Stewart
hence found no violation of the "establishment clause." With regard to the "free
exercise clause," he claimed the majority
had failed to satisfy its own requirementproof of the harm to the complainant. In
the Schempp case, the first set of facts with
which the Court was faced, the only evidence presented was Mr. Schempp's "prophecy" that he was afraid that his children
would be socially harmed; and in the second
fact situation, there was no evidence introduced since the original case was tried
on a demurrer. Since the "establishment
clause" had not been violated and there was
insufficient evidence to prove any harm to
the complainant, Justice Stewart concluded
that neither Bible reading statute should
34
have been declared unconstitutional.
It would appear that the principal decision is truly significant for the legal questions it leaves unanswered in its insistence
on neutrality, and also for the notoriety
it has created in the public mind and press.
The first question usually asked when the
Court strikes down a religious act long
practiced in public schools concerns the possible removal of the word "God" from the
33School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,

31 U.S.L. WEEK 4683, 4716 (U.S. June 17, 1963)
(dissenting opinion of Stewart).
34
Id. at 4718.
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pledge of allegiance, from our currency and
from all public edifices. Apparently to
avoid the adverse public reaction with
which the School PrayerCase was received,
the concurring opinions of Justices Goldberg and Harlan were careful to illustrate
that the present decision did not extend that
far. In fact, they virtually ratified such
practices as being within constitutional
limits. Even the majority went so far as to
explain that the reading of the Bible for
literary purposes or the teaching of a course
in comparative religions would be constitutionally permissible in the public
schools as long as no particular religion
was favored. 3 5
The second and far more serious question concerns the secularization of public
school training.36 When the Supreme Court
in an effort to remove all religious training
from public education prevents teaching
about God, does it create a maintainable
vacuum or does it promote another religious philospohy? Perhaps this question
can best be answered by an example. Most
educators will agree that an educational
system must teach social values. The
courses must explain, in some way, man's
relationship with his country and with his
fellow man. We must either choose to
teach social values or we must choose
not to teach them. The latter course would
seem to make public education meaningless
and necessarily render it valueless. 3 7 On

the other hand, if we are to teach social
values we are faced with a second choice
which has been complicated by the principal decision for we must apply either a
theistic or a non-theistic philosophy in explaining man's relationships. To apply a
theistic philosophy would be to violate the
specific dictates of this case since such an
approach would not appear to be neutral.
Yet to apply a non-theistic approach seems
no more neutral since it would favor such
non-theistic religions as the Ethical Culture
Society, the American Secular Union, or
the Secular Humanists. These are religions
just as much as Catholicism, Judaism or
Protestantism," s although there exists a
dichotomy in basic beliefs. "The fundamental principle of Secularism is that in his
whole conduct, man should be guided exclusively by considerations derived from the
present life itself. This principle is in strict
opposition to essential Catholic doctrines." 9
Since the application of either philosophy
to the teaching of social values would appear to favor some religion, social values
may not be taught because the means of
the teaching should be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the rule of strict
neutrality. The essence of the problem is that

35Id. at 4689; Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and

"XlI CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 676, 677 (1913).
"The essential thesis of the Ethical Movement

GERALD

&

FITZGERALD, METHODS AND CURRICULA

(2d ed. 1956);
(1946).
38 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957);
IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 8-10

HARTLEY, PROBLEMS IN PREJUDICE

Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

Prayer, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 735, 750 (1962).
3"The extention of the 'secularism' concept is
most evident in the history of Schempp v. Abington Township School Dist." Note, ChurchState Religious Institutions and Values, 37 NOTRE
DAME LAW.649, 672 (1962) (discussion of district
court decision).

• . . isthat morals, ethical conduct, and right
living are good in themselves and for that reason
must be practiced and not because of any command or sanction of any duty or Supreme Being."
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,

37 PRESTON,

School Prayer Case, 8

ELEMENTARY

TEACHING
SCHOOL

SOCIAL

STUDIES

IN

25 (2d ed. 1961);

THE
FITZ-

supra note 38, at 403-04; see generally, Ball, The
195 (1962).
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the Supreme Court attempts to select neutrality when faced with an either-or choice.
The goal of neutrality is admirable, but in the
area of public education it is unattainable. 4
It has long been the rule that if there is a
secular goal to be achieved and its implementation indirectly leads to discrimination against some particular sect, such
implementation would not be struck down
as unconstitutional.4 1 When we are in an
area where we must favor one religious
group or another, the majority should be
4 2

accommodated.

The teaching of social values can be
compared to the area of the Sunday Closing
4
Laws. In 1848, Specht v. Commonwealth 3
outlined what was to become the rationale
for most Sunday Closing Law decisions.
The decision indicated that periods of rest
were absolutely necessary to the well being
of society and further that such periods
must occur at regular intervals. The Court
stated that,
one day must be selected, and... the week
presents none which ... might not be regarded as favoring some one of the numerous religious sects .... In a Christian
community ... it is not surprising that Sunday should have received legislative sanction.

44

In teaching social values and in requiring
40 See Kurland, Of Church and State and the

Supreme Court, 29 U. OF CHI. L, REV. 1, 96
(1961); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 661 (1960); Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 426, 438
(1953).
41 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961);
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Sunday closings the purpose is the same,
namely, to prevent the breakdown of the
social order-a secular purpose. 45 In both
cases the implementation must favor one
religion, yet in the application of these
principles to like facts, the Supreme Court
decisions would apparently require a different result. Sunday Closing Laws which
favor religion in economic areas are declared legal but secular teaching which
favors a religion in public schools is unconstitutional.
The Court's decision in the Bible case
would appear to be more readily justifiable
on the grounds that required Bible reading
is a breach of the "establishment clause"
rather than its being a breach of neutrality.
The Bible would seem to violate the "establishment clause" because of its highly sectarian nature .4 While the use of the Bible
itself is not sectarian it becomes so when an
individual reads from one particular version.4 7 It would appear, therefore, that the
Court has correctly decided that the required reading of the Bible is unconstitutional as a violation of the first amendment,
but not for the reason given by the majority.
As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his
dissent, neutrality cannot be the goal of the
Supreme Court. When the Court attempts
to divorce God from lessons in the public
schools, it merely favors other religious
sects, the non-theists. Doesn't it appear that
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436
(1961); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710

45

(1885).
41 "Any instruction on any one of the subjects is

Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, supra

necessarily sectarian, because, while it may be
consistent with the doctrine of one or many of
the sects, it will be inconsistent with the doctrines
of one or more of them." People ex rel. Ring v.

note 35, at 744.
42 Costanzo, Prayerin Public Schools, 8 CATHOLIC

Board of Educ., 245 Ill.
334, 348, 92 N.E. 251,
255 (1910).

LAWYER 269, 277 (1962).
43 8 Pa. (Barr) 312 (1848).
44
1d. at 323.

47 KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1962); Kurland, The Regents Prayer
Case, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 33.

Two Guys v. McGinly, 366 U.S. 582, 595 (1961);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939);

